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Discussions
ZAHAR ON MACH, EINSTEIN AND MODERN SCIENCE
1 In his [1977] note (numbers in brackets will from now on mean pages of this
note) Elie Zahar states
(A) that Einstein, when introducing special relativity, violated 'cardinal' prin-
ciples of Mach's philosophy (205);
(B) that without the violation 'the special theory of relativity would never have
seen the light of the day' (195); and he infers
(C) that Mach's philosophy 'was largely irrelevant to the development of modern
physics' (195).
Now the fact that Einstein violated some 'principles' of Mach's philosophy
does not show that his ideas were independent of other principles of that phil-
osophy; nor does it show that the philosophy did not influence other parts of
modern physics, such as the quantum theory: Zahar's arguments do not
establish C.
2 They also fail to establish A.
Zahar mentions four conflicts between Mach and Einstein's ideas and pro-
cedures. They are (A 1): relativity 'is a causal theory in the traditional sense of
the word' (203) i.e. a theory involving an assymmetry while Mach's functional
approach eliminates all assymmetries (202). (A2) Einstein's definition of simul-
taneity violates 'one of Mach's cardinal methodological principles' (205) and it
is also 'radically different' (203) from Mach's definition of mass. (A3) the special
theory of relativity uses inertial frames which, being unobservable, are anathema
to Mach. 'It is therefore small wonder' writes Zahar on this point 'that Mach
should have disowned relativity' (206). Inertial frames are also needed to make
sense of general covariance hence Mach, when arguing for general covariance
'was violating a tenet of his own branch of positivism' (212). (A4) for Einstein
(a) 'laws have an ontological status over and above the observables which they
correlate with one another' (212) and (b) they must have such special status, for
otherwise the arguments for general covariance again fail to make sense.
3 But Mach, far from treating inertial systems as metaphysical monsters
examined their properties and watched with interest and approval the attempt
to make them a basis for astronomical measurements. He regards Corollary V
of Newton's Principia1 'as providing the only practically useful (and most likely
approximate) inertial system2 and he presents L. Lange's 'attractive idea' con-
cerning the definition of such systems.3 The definition, Mach remarks, separates
1
 Cajori (ed.) [1962], 20 f. 2 Mach [1933].
3
 Mach [1933], p. 233. Mach mentions some technical difficulties of Lange's definition,
but he nowhere regards it as metaphysical.
274 Paul Feyerabend
the 'conventional' and the empirical elements of the law of inertia which consists
in a 'restriction of the kinematically possible manifold'. Mach also describes
Seeliger's research concerning the relation between inertial systems and the
'empirical coordinate systems actually in use in astronomy'. The attempts to
establish 'ephemeris time' and a fundamental reference system' which are at-
tempts to make inertial systems the basis of astronomical observations are well
known to him and are regarded by him as important empirical investigations:
Mach's aversion to relativity has no connection with the occurrence of inertial
systems in it.
4 A411 is also incorrect. In his essay 'Physics and Reality'1 which criticises
the quantum theory for its 'incomplete representation of real things',1 Einstein
explains what he means by 'real existence':
Out of the multitude of our sense experience we take, mentally and arbi-
trarily, certain repeatedly occurring complexes of sense impressions . . .
and correlate to them a concept—the concept of the bodily object. Con-
sidered logically this concept is not identical with the totality of sense im-
pressions referred to; but it is a free creation of the human (or animal)
mind. On the other hand this concept owes its meaning and its justification
exclusively to the totality of the sense impressions which we associate
with it.
The second step is to be found in the fact that, in our thinking (which
determines our expectations), we attribute to this concept of a bodily object
a significance which is to a high degree independent of the sense impressions
which originally gave rise to it. This is what we mean when we attribute to
the bodily object a 'real existence'.4
This passage is pure Mach1 as can be seen from what Mach says about concepts
in Erketmtnis und Irrtum': according to Einstein the issue in quantum theory
is not an 'ontological' issue (212) whatever that means—it is an issue over differ-
ent modes of 'arbitrarily' ordering sense data.'
1
 Cf. the explanations given in the Explanatory Supplement to the Astronomical Ephemeris
and Nautical Almanac, London, 1061.
1
 Einstein [1936] p. 221; reprinted in [1954], 290 ff. I shall quote from the latter source.




 Except that Mach's account is more realistic than Einstein's: Mach ascribes to a natural
development what Einstein regards as a 'free creation of the human (or animal) mind'.
For Einstein concepts are freely at our disposal. For Mach their formation obeys
psychological laws.
* Both steps are explained already in Mach's earlier writings, for example in his [1896],
pp. 207, 213 (first presented at a meeting of the Vienna Academy in 1882).
7
 The same applies to Boltzmann's defence of atomism. 'Hertz made it very clear to
physicists' Boltzmann said in 1899 (See his [1905], p. 215) 'what philosophers most
likely have said long ago, that a theory cannot be an objective thing, in agreement with
nature, but can at most be a mental picture of phenomena, being related to them like
the sign to the thing signified'. (Hertz had used the term ScheinbiU—phantom picture).
Boltzmann, accordingly, regarded theories such as the atomic theory as 'mental pictures'
(p. 142); his defence of atomism was not an 'ontological' argument, but an argument
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Confronted with Machian utterances by scientists Zahar speaks (more than
once) of 'paying lip service to Machian positivism' (195) and he adds that
scientists often do one thing and say another (197): obviously it needs a phil-
osopher to find out what is really going on. But the above quotation cannot be
explained away in this simple fashion. It is part of a long article on the situation
in physics; it prepares a criticism of the quantum theory; it does not belong to
Einstein's early period where some 'lip service' to Mach might have occurred
(though it is not at all clear why Einstein should pay 'lip service' to any phil-
osophy) but to the 'reactionary' part of Einstein's life when to outsiders he more
than ever seemed to be an 'old fashioned realist' (195). The quotation shows that
he was 'old fashioned' in the sense of Mach: his objections are conceptual, not
'ontological'. And the article as a whole shows that the saying-doing dichotomy
is anything but realistic in Einstein's case: it is very implausible to assume that
Einstein, when directing attention to epistemological matters closely connected
with the physical research he was engaged in should have failed to know what
he was talking about.l A look at A$ shows that he certainly did not on the matter
at issue.
5 Zahar says that arguments about covariance involve the behaviour of laws
in different reference systems and therefore assume 'that laws and their form
possess an objective status' (212); they also assume coordinate systems which
are forbidden by Mach and run counter to the principle, allegedly defended by
Mach, that the simplest formulation of a law is the best: 'there is no good reason,
from a Machian viewpoint, why the choice of a certain coordinate system should
not prove more convenient than another' (212). The last point is of course true
and this is why particular problems such as the relativistic advance of the peri-
helion of Mercury are calculated in special reference systems (Schwarzschild's
calculation). But if the purpose is to get laws connecting the special cases then
'physics, for reasons of economy, often gives us equations between functions of
the primary variables and not equations between the primary variables them-
selves" and the task is then to make these equations as simple as possible: Zahar
has a rather simpleminded view of Mach's conception of economy. But does not
concerning the superiority of some pictures over others and he emphasised that argu-
ments of this kind were perfectly in agreement with Mach's general philosophy. Mach,
on the other hand ('whose relevant writings greatly contributed to the clarification of
my own views'—op.cit., p. 142, n. 1) had no objections to even the most outlandish
ones of Maxwell's models and ascribed to them 'Maxwell's extraordinary success':
Mach [1917] (first published in 1905), p. 229 f. These and other matters are explained
in detail in M. S. Curd's thesis, Ludwig Boltzmarm't Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh,
1978, where the 'hagiographic' account of the 'realist' Boltzmann's battle against short-
sighted positivists such as Mach and Ostwald is laid to rest once and for all.
1
 Einstein is the last of the late nineteenth century scientist-philosophers who like
Maxwell, Hertz, Mach, Boltzmann and Duhem designed philosophies for advancing
science and used (corrected) these philosophies in their research. Today philosophers
are outsiders with correspondingly unrealistic views of history and scientific method.
Zahar wants to convince us that these outsiders have a better view of science than the
most outstanding scientists. His article tells otherwise.
» 'Die oekonomische Natur der Physikalischen Forschung' quoted after Mach [1896],
p. 228.
276 Paul Feyerabend
the formation of functions of laws assume that laws have an 'objective status'?
Yes—but not in Zahar's sense: talking about blueprints assumes that blueprints
are 'objective' but not in the sense that they have an 'ontological status over and
above1 the things they are blueprints of. The 'objectivity' of a blueprint, however,
can be easily explained in Einstein's (i.e. Mach's) manner, by giving an account
of the way in which its elements hang together. Reference systems, finally, are
elementary for a Machian (see the refutation of A3 above). This concludes the
refutation of A4.
6 There remains A2. The answer is here that Zahar has interpreted a difference
between definitions (definition of mass on the one side, definition of simultaneity
on the other) as a difference between philosophies (Mach's and Einstein's).
But Mach, far from subjecting definitions to rules 1-3 (202/) distinguishes
various types of definitions, purely 'nominal stipulative' (207) definitions in-
cluded. For example, he considers the following definitions of a time metric:
(a) t is proportional to the angle of the earth with respect to some inertial system;
(b) t is proportional to the logarithm of this angle, and he comments on the
arbitrary and rival-hypotheses-compatible (207) nature of the stipulations.1
Einstein's definition of simultaneity falls into this category and is therefore
anything but a 'violation] . . . of Mach's cardinal methodological principle'
(205). Nor did Mach ever subject definitions to condition 2 (203). Quite the
contrary—in his definition of mass he explicitly states the dependence of the
definition on 'the existence of a special, acceleration—determining quality of
bodies'2 i.e. on what Zahar calls theoretical presuppositions. Condition 3 is not
Machian either. For although Mach objects to what one might call direct
circularity (explicit definitions which contain the thing to be defined) he is well
aware of the fact that concepts, being dependent on each other in many ways,
cannot always be explained in isolation. Zahar's condition 1, however, (201) can
be refuted at once: 'Which concepts we form' writes Mach,3 'how we delimit
them with respect to each other—all that can be decided only by the needs of
practice, or of science': Mach is much more liberal than modern philosophers of
science and his 'cardinal methodological principle' (205) is nothing but a chimaera
in Zahar's head.
Ai, finally, overlooks that Mach paid great attention to unidirectional pro-
cesses4'and occasionally regarded them as fundamental: not all connections are
symmetrical and those which are 'are secondary, not basic'.6 Zahar connects
Mach's alleged failure to account for assymmetry to his 'conceptual—as opposed
to the propositional—approach' (202). He overlooks that Mach's concepts are
concepts in use,6 i.e. have propositional content while the arrow of implication
(203) being reducible to disjunction, contains no asymmetry. What is needed
in matters of symmetry vs. asymmetry is not an emancipation from an alleged
1
 Mach [1917], p. 435. Cf. also Mach's comments on the conventional elements of the
law of inertia mentioned above.
1
 Mach [1933], p. an . ' Mach [1917], p. 129.
* Mach [1933], p. 218 and Mach [1922], 286 f., especially 286, lines 12 ff.
* Mach [1917]. P- 443-
* 126 ff. and passim: Mach has a decidedly constructivist (in the sense of mathematical
constructivism) attitude towards concepts.
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'conceptual' philosophy and its replacement by a Popperian propositionalism,1
what is needed is 'more research' concerning natural processes.8
7 There are many other mistakes. Zahar: 'Mach thought . . . he could boil
everything down to spatial measurements' (206). Mach: 'there is an unchangeable
physical time object just as there is an unchangeable physical space object—the
rigid body'.3 Zahar: 'Elements . . . are the simplest component parts of sen-
sations' (200—his emphasis); Mach: 'elements are sensations only insofar' as we
consider their dependence on a particular complex of elements, viz. our body;
'they are simultaneously physical objects, viz. insofar as we consider other functional
dependencies'.4 Disregarding the dependencies elements are therefore as much
physical objects as they are sensations.8 Zahar's biggest mistake which makes
manifest his ignorance concerning Mach's philosophy is to describe it as
'strictly positivistic' (198).6 Already the title of Mach's first major work should
have given him pause. An author who writes an Analysis of sensations obviously
does not take sensations as basic. And, indeed, Mach insists on an analysis of
sensations including an examination of their dependence on physiological con-
ditions,7 he regards results of such an analysis as 'temporary'8 and sensation
talk as involving a 'one sided theory'9 ; he asserts that introspection does not
suffice as an instrument of analysis but must be combined with a physiological
study10; he points out that our ideas affect not only 'the development of ex-
perience' but 'enrich every . . . fact'11; he objects to Mill's aversion to hypotheses
which 'favours what has been found over what has still to be discovered'12; he
encourages the researcher 'not to be too fearsome when introducing hypotheses.
Quite the contrary, a little boldness in these matters furthers research'?; he
quotes with approval Priestley's observation that 'very lame and imperfect
theories are sufficient to suggest useful experiments while serving to correct
those theories and give birth to others more perfect. These then occasion
farther experiments which bring us still nearer to the truth, and in this method of
approximation we must be content to proceed . . .'14; he describes himself as a
1
 Zahar, like all good Popperians, ascribes even the most trite and useless idea to Popper.
In the case of propositionalism the origin is clear: it is Aristotle.
• Mach [1933], p. 219.
J
 Mach [1917], p. 393.
4
 Mach [1922], p. 13, my emphasis.
' Mach seems inclined to count some of Duhem's 'qualities' among the elements. Cf.
his introduction to the German translation of Duhem's main philosophical work, Ziel
und Struktur der Phytikalischen Theorien, Leipzig, 1008. But 'qualities', for Duhem, are
physical primitives such as currents, charges and so on.
° Carnap [1928], p. 87, notices with surprise that Mach's 'basis does not consist of events
belonging to the perceiving subject' ('die nichteigenpsychische Basis') and point out
that this feature 'constitutes a disturbing element in the total picture of his (Mach's)
ideas'. Obviously he has formed a false conception of this picture—and he now notices
difficulties. No such difficulties exist for the Popperian Zahar.
7
 Cf. Mach [1896], p. 228.
•Mach [1922], p. 24.
•18.
" Mach [1896], p. 228. •• Mach [1917J, p. 245.
"249. "247.
14
 240 f., my emphasis.
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'non-empiricist' or 'not-only-empiricist'1 and, considering his reconstruction
scheme of science in terms of hypothetical elements (not sensations) he warns
that 'there is no need to turn this passing point of view into a system for life whose
slaves we then become . . .'.* There is a great distance indeed between Mach's
'philosophy'3 and Zahar's rather unbelievable distortion of it. To ascribe such
views to Mach shows not only an astonishing ignorance of relevant historical
material; to assume that a scientist—philosopher and social critic of Mach's
calibre4 should in the end have come up with such a sophomoric theory shows
in addition an enormous lack of imagination and historical understanding.5
8 There is, then, no conflict between Mach's philosophy and the (genesis of
the) special theory of relativity. But is there a positive relation? Are there elements
in Einstein's early research that show a similarity to Mach's philosophy and
may therefore be regarded as evidence of Machian influences? On the other
hand—what are we to make of Mach's criticism of relativity? I shall now give
some very tentative answers to these questions.
To explain Mach's criticism I draw attention to two passages contained in a
longer quotation from Mach by Zahar (197). These passages both refute Zahar
and also point to an answer rather different from Zahar's. The fact that Zahar
quotes them and yet continues on his own line of attack shows to what an extent
Popperian mythology is capable of blinding its followers.
Mach discredits relativity because he finds it 'growing more and more dog-
matical' (first reason) and because of 'particular reasons', 'based on the physi-
ology of the senses, the theoretical ideas and, above all, the conceptions resulting
from experiments' (second reason).
I connect the second reason with Mach's attempt to find a point of view that
is not restricted to a particular subject such as physics, or psychology 'but can
1
 Hugo Dingier [1924], p. 61, footnote. Cf. also notebooks, vol. ii, p. 16 from back (con-
tained in Dingler's book) where Mach puts sensations in their place and wants to free
science from their dominance: Mach criticised not only realism, but all one sided
philosophies. Zahar refers to Dingler's book, but seems to have read only a tiny part of it.
" Mach [1896], p. 226. One should compare this quotation with the Einstein quotations
in section 9.
' Mach refused to regard his hints or 'apercus' ([1922], p. 39) as a philosophy: 'I am a
scientist, not a philosopher . . . and I think I am innocent of the fact that people have
regarded me a"s an idealist, Berkeleyan, even a materialist.' Loc. cit. 'Above all there is
no Machian philosophy' he writes in the introduction to his [1917] p. vii—'there is,
at most, a methodology of science and a psychology of knowledge and like all scientific
theories these things must be regarded as preliminary and incomplete attempts' (my emphasis).
There are many philosophers with whom Mach feels he has 'points of contact', Spinoza
among them ([1922], p. 38). Note how much more dogmatic critical rationalists sound
when pronouncing on their 'philosophy'.
4
 'I don't think anyone ever gave me so strong an impression of pure intellectual genius.
He apparently has read everything and thought about everything, and has an absolute
simplicity of manner and winningness of smile when his face lights up, that are
charming . . .', William James about Ernst Mach, letter to his wife of 2 Nov. 1882
quoted from Joachim Thiele [1978], p. 169. Of course, it is difficult for a dweller in the
slums of late twentieth century philosophy of science to guess what an intelligent man
may or may not assume.
* Or else it shows that Popperians, being engulfed by the banality of their own 'philosophy'
have completely lost their sense of perspective.
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be retained in all domains'.1 Or, to express it differently, but still in agreement
with Mach's intentions2 : he sets himself the task to find theories that cut across
traditional boundaries such as the boundary between physics and psychology
without being beset by the mind-body problem. What have 'experiments' got to
do with the construction of such a theory? In an earlier essay Mach comments
that 'the mental field', i.e. the domain where thoughts, emotions etc. appear and
disappear 'can never be fully explored by introspection. But introspection com-
bined with physiological research which explores the physical connections can
put this field clearly before us and only thereby make us acquainted with our
inner being' :4 introspection does not suffice; it grasps only part of 'mental events';
their whole nature is revealed by introspection plus physiology. The partially
physical character of the research leads to the expectation that our 'inner being'
may without break merge into the physical world thus providing a unified account
of 'mental' and 'physical' events and laws. A purely physical theory of space
(or spacetime) does not fit into such a research programme. This is the 'particular
reason'.5
Now despite this disadvantage the theory of relativity might still be welcome
as a step in the right direction were it not for the fact that it has been 'growing
more and more dogmatical' (first reason). Was this the case? Was there really
an increase of dogmatism, or what Mach regarded as dogmatism, in physics, in
connection with the theory of relativity? Not on Einstein's part but certainly on
the part of Planck, Mach's arch enemy.8 Planck, after some wavering, defended
a reality of the kind Mach and Boltzmann had rejected, he regarded relativity
as a step towards this reality, made himself many contributions towards the
development and extension of the theory7 and so furthered its dogmatic inter-
pretation. I conjecture that this explains Mach's criticism and the harshness of
it but it also shows that the criticism does not touch Einstein's achievements. It
concerns only their misuse for dogmatic philosophical purposes.8
Mach [1922], p. 255.
Op cit., p. 26.
Note that Zahar cannot explain the role of experiments in Mach's objections: one does
not need experiments to show that a theory is metaphysical.
Mach [1896], p. 228.
There.are various hypotheses concerning the 'experiments'. Thus Hemeck conjectures
that Mach objected to the assumption of the constancy of c and that the 'experiments'
dealt mainly with these matters: D. K. Heller [1964], p. 142. According to Herneck,
Philipp Frank gave Dingier part of the responsibility for Mach's attitude. (Physikalisde
Blatter, xvii, (1961), p. 276). However the fact that Mach emphasised the need to com-
bine psychological, physiological, physical as well as biological investigations both in his
early and in his late writings and that he deplored a purely physical approach to the
problem of space seems to favour my interpretation: relativity was OK especially as it
introduced the interdependence of spatial and temporal aspects but it did not go far enough
and it became a hindrance to research if interpreted dogmatically, in the manner of Planck.
* Cf. the rather acrimonious exchange between Mach and Planck, republished in Toulmin
[1968]. Although the tone of learned exchange was at the time a little less vapid than it
is today, thi* was the only polemic Mach ever published.
' Cf. the account and the literature in Stanley Goldberg [1972].
" Similar remarks apply to Mach's rejection of atoms. First a little myth should be laid
to rest. Stefan Meyer of the Institute for Radium Research at the University of Vienna
reports and many writers have repeated that Mach, having been shown a spinthariscope
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9 Is Einstein's work influenced by Mach? I think it is. However the influence
becomes clear only if one disregards technical details and looks at the wider
picture. We then notice that Einstein strives for the most direct expression of
phenomena: electric induction depends only on the relative motions of the
systems concerned while the aether theories treat the effects of the motion of a
magnet (relatively to the aether) differently from the effects of the motion of a
closed electric circuit.1 Lorentz explains null results approximately and using a
variety of rather doubtful hypotheses* while Einstein regards them as basic
facts.3 In his investigations of the structure of radiation Einstein does not start
from basic theory, as Planck did, but from uncomprehended but empirically
adequate laws and develops their 'ontological' consequences. 'The key to his
reasoning' writes Martin Klein on this procedure4 'was his reversal of Planck's
procedure. Instead of trying to derive the distribution law from some more
fundamental starting point, he turned the argument around. Planck's law had
the solid backing of experiment; why not assume its correctness and see what
conclusion it implied as to the structure of radiation?' He plays 'theoretical
pictures'6 (his term—most likely taken from Boltzmann whom he read carefully6)
off against each other to find their limits.' Like Mach, Einstein is mainly in-
terested in 'theories of principle',8 i.e. in theories which cover a wide variety of
phenomena without assumptions about details of their constitution (this also
said 'jetzt glaube ich an die Atome', Sitisungtberichtc der Oesterreichitchen Akademie der
Wissenschaftcn—Mathematisch-Naturuiiuentchaftliche Klasse, Abtaa, Band 159, Heft 1/2,
5. Heinz Post has pointed out that Mach was a kind person, that Meyer was very
enthusiastic and rather deaf and that he most likely misunderstood the kind remarks
Mach made in such a personally difficult situation. And who would think that Mach
who had not been impressed by some very powerful arguments (Brownian motion, for
example) should fall for such a flimsy exhibition? Secondly, Mach's objections were
firmly grounded in some very real difficulties of the atomic theory which were often
forgotten in view of apparent successes. Finally, the nineteenth century atom has indeed
disappeared and has been replaced by a much more complex entity, constituted out of
relations between well-defined measurements and no longer in conflict with Mach's
ideas.
1
 'On the electrodynamics of Moving Bodies' quoted from Einstein and others [1923]
P- 37-
* Cf. the articles by Lorentz in Einstein and others [1923].
'I have not been able to obtain for the equations referred to moving axes exactly the
same form as for those which apply to a stationary system.' Lorentz [1952], p. 230.
'Einstein simply postulates what we have deduced, with some difficulty, and not
altogether satisfactorily, from the fundamental equations of the electromagnetic field.
By doing so, he may certainly take credit for making us see in the negative result of
experiments like those of Michelson, Raleigh and Bruce, not a fortuitous compensation
of opposing effects, but the manifestation of a general and fundamental principle.'
Actually, Einstein did not 'make us see it' that way, for there was no explanation, he
simply took this situation as his starting point: 'Wir wollen diese Vermurung zur
Voraussetzung erheben'—Einstein and others [1923], p. 26. English translation op. cit.,
p. 38.
4
 Klein [1964], p. 9. Cf. also T. S. Kuhn [1978], 180 f.
» Cf. the first page of his paper on the photoelectric effect reprinted e.g. in ter Haar
[1967], P- 9i.
* Cf. the references in Seelig's biography.
7 Mach was well aware of the fact that different theories could cover some domains
equally well. Cf. also his remarks on analogues in science his [1917], p. 220 ff.
' Cf. the autobiographical notes in Schilpp (ed.) [1949], esp. p. 53.
Zahar on Mach, Einstein and Modern Science 281
establishes a link with Duhem). Einstein's remarks on geometry are in perfect
agreement with what is found in the relevant chapters of Erkemttms und Irrtum1
and in earlier writings.2 As regards method, Einstein emphasises the great
difference between the work of the scientist and the work of the epistemologist
(philosopher of science): 'The external conditions' he writes* 'which are set
[for the scientist] by the facts of experience do not permit him to let himself to
be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world, by the ad-
herence to an epistemological system. He, therefore, must appear to the sys-
tematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist.' 'Yes, I may have
started it' he tells Infeld about a new fashion in physics—'but I regarded these
ideas as temporary. I never thought that others would take them so much more
seriously than I did.'4 Or, in a lighter mood: 'A good joke should not be repeated
too often.'5 Compare this with Mach's 'the schematisms of formal logic and also
of inductive logic are not of much use, for the intellectual situations are never
repeated in exactly the same way. But the examples of great scientists are very
instructive . . .',* the already, quoted passage 'there is no need to turn this
passing point of view (i.e. Mach's own suggestions) into a system for life whose
slaves we then become'7 as well as with Mach's modest and somewhat mocking
attitude towards his own 'philosophy' and you will see that Einstein and, as a
matter of fact, all creative scientists are much closer to Mach than to, say,
Popper. Mach, Einstein, Bohr use philosophy as an instrument of research that
guides research but is also transformed by it while philosophers pontificate on a
process they do not understand and would not know how to change. Small
wonder they want to persuade us that Mach's ideas are as vapid as their own.
University of California, Berkeley
Eidgendssische Technische Hochschule, Zurich
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ON THINGS AND CAUSES IN SPACETIME*
Introduction
1 Things in Spacetime
a Causes in Spacetime
INTRODUCTION
Graham Nerlich's admirable article 'What can geometry explain?' [1979] per-
suades me that we should take the General Theory of Relativity to have reduced
'gravitation to spacetime curvature' (p. 81). I agree with Nerlich that spacetime
is an entity, irreducible to the spatiotemporal relations between the things and
events in it; and that the variable curvature of its geodesies, induced by the
distribution of matter, explains geometrically what we see as acceleration caused
by gravitational forces.
From these truths, however, Nerlich has drawn two further, false, conclusions.
One is that we must give up 'the space and time language of enduring continu-
ants' (p. 81); the other is that a serious puzzle is generated by 'the possibility of
causal intervention by us to change the gravitational field' (p. 82). I take these
points in turn, since the first is the more important and less obvious of the two
and, when it is dealt with, the second can be disposed of quite easily.
I THINGS IN SPACETIME
I take it that by 'continuants' Nerlich means what have been called 'substances'
as opposed to events. I shall call them 'things', and I take them to differ from
temporally extended events in lacking temporal parts. The question then is why
accepting General Relativity as Nerlich construes it should force us to deny the
* This note was written during my tenure of a Radcliffe Fellowship, for which I am
indebted to the Radcliffe Trustees.
